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In this paper I shall confront three basic questions. 
First, the relevance of epistemic structures, as formal-
ized and dealt with by current epistemic logics, for a 
general Theory of meaning. Here I acknowledge M. Dum-
mett’s idea that a systematic account of what is meaning of 
an arbitrary language subsystem must especially take into 
account the inferential components of meaning itself. That 
is, an analysis of meaning comprehension processes, 
given in terms of epistemic logics and semantics for epis-
temic notions.  
The second and third questions relate to the ontological 
and epistemological framework for this approach. 
Concerning the epistemological aspects of an epistemic 
theory of meaning, the question is: how epistemic logics 
can eventually account for the informative character of 
meaning comprehension processes. “Information” seems 
to be built in the very formal structure of epistemic pro-
cesses, and should be exhibited in modal and possible-
world semantics for propositional knowledge and belief. 
However, it is not yet clear what is e.g. a possible world. 
That is: how it can be defined semantically, other than by 
accessibility rules which merely define it by considering its 
set-theoretic relations with other sets-possible worlds. 
Therefore, it is not clear which is the epistemological status 
of propositional information contained in the structural 
aspects of possible world semantics. The problem here 
seems to be what kind of meaning one attributes to the 
modal notion of possibility, thus allowing semantical and 
synctactical selectors for possibilities. This is a typically 
Dummett-style problem. 
The third question is linked with this epistemological 
problem, since it is its ontological counterpart. It concerns 
the limits of the logical space and of logical semantics for a 
of meaning. That is, it is concerned with the kind of 
structure described by inferential processes, thought, in a 
fregean perspective, as pre-conditions of estentional 
treatment of meaning itself. The second and third ques-
tions relate to some observations in Wittgenstein’s Tracta-
tus. I shall also try to show how their behaviour limits the 
explicative power of some semantics for epistemic logics 
(Konolige’s and Levesque’s for knowledge and belief). 
1. Relevance of epistemic modal notions 
and inferences for a Theory of meaning 
Dummett’s basic idea is that a systematic and non-modest 
theory of meaning must account for what it means to 
understand a statement. In Dummett’s view, this account 
must possibly support a constructive metaphysical option. 
But as stated in The logical basis of Metaphysics, meta-
physical questions and statements themselves depend on 
semantic assumptions and pre-semantics ways of con-
sidering formal structures relevant for meaning (thus, also 
on synctactic ways of accounting for combinatorial aspects 
linked to compositionality).  
Dummett assumes that molecolarism, as opposed to 
holism, allows for a heuristically interesting treatment of 
modalities of meaning, taken to be similar to fregean 
Sinne. He approaches this by asking a question concern-
ing the very limits and status of what we may define the 
“epistemic space” of meaning. This is in turn taken as the 
set of propositional contexts relevant (primarily or 
indirectly) for comprehension of a language subsystem. 
These contexts actually exhibit the structure of information 
conveyed by the subsystems considered. They are 
therefore to be thought of as propositional contexts in the 
proper sense, that is: as an account of how the world 
would be if the understood propositions actually held 
(which is different form saying: if assertions expressing 
those propositions were true, in that it can be adapted to a 
non-classically truth functional definition of meaning such 
as Dummett’s).  
In the case of meaning analysis for logical constants the 
informational content exibithed by the propositional modal-
ity (set theoretic range of possibilities allowed) is a formal 
structure. That is, a formal partition on the considered 
fragment of reality establishing a meta-semantical (stipu-
lated) pre-condition for semantical interpretation inside our 
formal universe. In a way, then, the formal structure of 
reality considered as the object of logical analysis is stipu-
lated, as it depends directly on the consequences of 
stipulation for the meaning of logical constants. This 
meaning is in turn given in epistemic terms: it represents 
the epistemic pre-condition of access to semantical struc-
tures and regularities. An other way of putting it is by 
saying, as Dummett himself does, that the meaning of 
logical laws (axiomatizations of given semantics and con-
sequent theorems and validities) depends directly on the 
meaning of logical constants. 
One can obviously assign to logical constants different 
types of meaning. The main selector for these types is the 
specification of what kind of formal reality, if any, is de-
scribed by constants. Here I shall assume, coherent with 
an anti-realist assumption (yet to be investigated), that this 
reality is an epistemic reality. It is, in other worlds, the 
structure described by our way of describing semantical 
structures. The structure of epistemic access to semantics 
is tipically modal. This is independent from our assuming 
that its semantical counterpart should be possible world 
semantics. Modality represents the basic meta-semantical 
notion also in those logical treatments of meaning and logi-
cal consequence relations where modal concepts such as 
possibility are taken to be merely synctatical tools, for 
example (indirectly) in intuitionistic logics. 
We are therefore in the necessity to cope with the 
question of what a modal structure is, whether it is treated 
semantically or sinctactically. In other words, what is a 
possible world or an intuitionistic state of information, 
which turn into a (meta-)semantical structure as soon as 
they are operationalized by meaning stipulation for logical 
constants? Semantics for epistemic logic proper seems to 
be parasytic on such questions. They turn our attention to 
the epistemological question of what a possibility is. So: 
concerning what kind of propositional structure is taken 
into account in possible world semantics for epistemic 
logics when I conditionalize the meaning of a belief relation 
statement to the range of possibilities considered (and 
linked to each other by accessibility relations or synctactic 
sieves). The question also exhibits its obvious ontological 




side: what happens when I take possibility to be a meta-
semantical structure, therefore defining the limits of logical 
space. As we shall se, both these questions directly 
determine the heuristic and expressive capacity of epis-
temic systems. But let us first give a brief account of how 
the epistemological-ontological pair can be treated. 
2. Wittgenstein and Carnap on possible 
worlds: ontology and semantics 
Traditionally, there are two basic ways of confronting the 
question. The first is suggested by the essentialist 
approach found in the Tractatus; the second is typically 
Carnap’s view on deductive logics and its abstract 
ontology.  
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus offers an important account of 
how modalility as a pre-semantical tool should be viewed. 
The account is based on a quasi-realist reduction of 
epistemology (how we should understand contextual 
meaningful structures) to metaphysics.  
It then reduces the question concerning the structure of 
our epistemic access to meaningful configurations to the 
question of the latters’ real structure – thus defining the 
notion of possibility as a realistic notion based on real 
(physical?) combinatory modalities.  
Wittgenstein’s modal atomism, as Bradley among others 
has defined it, plays on the notion of logical form, and on 
the general framework used to explain this notion, that is: 
a picture theory of language. In this account, logical form 
exhibits modality as the fundamental property of language, 
a property that (opposite to Frege’s analysis of meaning as 
sense in indirect contexts, where modality turn up to be the 
new denoted) cannot be denoted because it defines the 
limits of denotation. As it is said in the Notebooks, giving 
the “nature of the proposition” can be equally thought as 
“giving the nature of all being” (January 22th 1915). In the 
Tractatus, propositions (information expressed by 
statements) are concatenations of names. Combinatory 
conditions of an object (thus of its denoting term) are 
assumed as a basic structure. Because of the shift of 
combinatory calculus from synctactic to semantical level, 
such conditions are the possibility conditions of factual 
structures in which an object can enter as a constituent. 
Logical form is thus a possibility of structure beared by 
objects. Objects are then defined by modal relations 
constituting “states of affairs”. Possibility attains to states 
of affairs themselves (Tlp 2.061-062). A proposition (a 
propositional context) shows a formal partition on the set of 
all possible states of affairs relevant for object-name’s 
meaning. It exhibits which states of affairs are made actual 
(as a meaning context for the atom-expression considered) 
and which ones are not. Consequently, “a proposition 
shows how things are, and says that they are so and so” 
(Tlp 4.022). Here the formal structure shown is the limiting 
pre-condition for what is said; therefore no analysis is 
possible on which criteria we have for selecting sub-
structures relevant at each stage for the meaning of the 
language sub-systems considered. These criteria are not a 
matter of stipulation. 
Thus if understanding a proposition means knowing 
what happens if it is true (if the assertion expressing it is 
true), the meta-semantical conditions on “what happens” 
cannot be represented and analysed in logical terms. This 
is because the analysis would then have as its object the 
set of possibility conditions one of whose sub-sets is the 
possibility condition of analysis itself. 
Logical statements take as their object this formal 
structure, which is also their form. Thus, it is a non-sense, 
in Wittgenstein’s terms, to proceed from the level of mere 
showing (e.g a tautology shows that it is a tautology) to 
that of representing (the conditions because of which the 
tautology is a tautology). The information context epressed 
by a proposition is then given in structural and non-
epistemic terms. Its comprehension is at the same time the 
very limit of inferential process constituing meaning com-
prehension. Modality is here a tool for selection of possible 
sub-systems inside a universe-set, and it says nothing 
about itself (about the criteria for this selection). One may 
say that this depends partly from a fregean heritage (con-
sisting in taking generality as the object of logical analysis), 
partly from a biased metaphysic view (assigning to 
generality a non-constructivist status). However, how 
strange as this might seem, similar problems are at issue 
also in a conventionalist approach like Carnap’s, suggest-
ing that something very important concerning the opera-
tional structure of modality (thus its epistemic properties) 
remains problematic. Better said, suggesting that a non-
traditional ontological treatment of modality is strongly 
needed - one able to overcome classical disctinctions 
between realism and anti-realism for what concerns the 
informative charachter of possibility-selection structures as 
basic modal structures for meaning comprehension 
processes. Thus, for the truly epitemic component of 
meaning. 
Carnap’s treatment of modality can be viewd as a sub-
set of semantic and synctatic analysis for mathematical 
and logical propositions. Since traditional empiricist criteria 
for significance cannot applied to denoted abstract entities 
of mathematics, the question arises of what constitutes a 
significance truth-functional criteria for abstract semantics. 
One needs to ask what kind of reality is described by 
synctactical constructions, e.g. to explicit the ontology 
underneath treatment of derivations and proofs and 
formulate hypothesis on what kind of status attains to 
epistemic structures and inferences (to the semantic 
selectors of posibilities relevant for comprehension of a 
language sub-system, since they also exhibit meta-
semantical properties). Carnap’s idea is that meaning is 
given by inferential connections from statements to 
verification or truth conditions, and that truth and falsity of 
mathematical statements is built into the very structure 
constitutive of these connections. So mathematics and 
logics study the articulation of inferential consequences 
admissible from systematic premises. Such premises are 
defined as merely conventional.  
Consequently, modality is a property attaining to this 
epistemic (synctactical) structure. It therefore does not 
describe anything, since it contributes to define the way we 
refer to anything, which is exactly what is described by 
logics. In a way, all logic is epistemic, and its meta-
semantical pre-conditions are not a matter of ontology or 
epistemology, but rather a pragmatic one. So structural 
necessity in meta-semantical terms, and concerning 
questions of foundation, is not ontological. It is an arbitrary 
criteria for conditionalization of possibilities inside the 
chosen logical net. Possibilities are then merely inferential 
tools, and completely de-substantialized. 
Carnap’s state descriptions are based on this approach. 
Think for example of the definition of L-equivalence as 
equivalence of an informational content which is defined 
by mapping inferential structures onto the formal synctacti-
cal criteria adopted for defining state descriptions. So, they 
are actually mapped onto themselves. The heuristic 
capacity of Carnap’s modal logic seems to be none. It 
cannot give any account of the criteria for defining what 




(state of affairs) is possible and what is not. It is true that 
intensions are defined in propositional terms: but then, in 
turn, a proposition refers to combinatory clusters of 
synctatical structures.  
What we need here is a semantical tool to specify how 
the synctactic aspect of combinatory rules relates to the 
semantical notion of possibility, and how this relation tells 
us something about possibility meta-semantics. The notion 
of information conveyed by selection of relevant possibili-
ties is here fundamental. It is clear that a condition for 
expliciting this notion is to adopt a propositional treatment 
of modality, on which epistemic structures are mapped. So 
that “possible states of the worlds” are in some way 
distinguished and related to epistemic inferential ways of 
having access to them. Classical examples of this 
approach are given by Hintikka’s game theoretic seman-
tics, by Fine’s analysis of e.g. propositional disjunction, 
and finally by cluster-models for possible world semantics 
– where the latter directly takes into account the episte-
mological space in which semantics is viewed. 
Generally, propositional semantics seem to be much 
more interesting than merely synctactical approaches. We 
shall better see this in viewing Konolige’s logics and 
Levesque’s system for implicit and explicit belief. 
Before turning to these, just a brief observation. Onto-
logical problems concerning possible worlds semantics 
have traditionally been treated in two different ways. One 
is typically Kripke’s: ontology is given in terms of definition 
of identity and rigidity of designators. This is, however, an 
approach trying to fix the semantical space of modality 
from an estentional point of view. The second approach 
consists in saying what a possible world is directly in 
metaphysical terms: this is typically David Lewis’approach.  
It seems that definitions in terms of semantics, which 
only as a second step tie semantics to ontology, are rather 
problematic. Even if we say that a possible world is a 
counterfactual, this does not tell us anything about the 
semantic and ontological structure of “counterfactuality”. 
Nor, of course, we can give credit to the idea that a purely 
infra-systemic notion of a possible world as a maximal 
consistent set of well formed propositions is sufficient.  
One might reply that this cluster of problems simply does 
not make sense. The idea would then be to leave out any 
meta-semantic option, and go for an interpretation of 
possible worlds as merely useful tools for logical analysis 
of correct and valid inferences in an axiomatized logical 
system. However, this will not do if the aim is to use 
possible world semantics for an epistemic theory of 
meaning. Here it seems essential to investigate the 
structure onto which epistemic inferences are built, taking 
seriously Frege’s idea about links between Sinn and 
Bedeutung, both in terms of model-theoretic properties 
and of formally ontological assumptions. The question then 
becomes: since propositional modality carries the (formal) 
information about meaning, as well as its epistemic 
conditionalization to the structure exhibited by modality 
itself, then how is this conditionalization to be investi-
gated? (Different ways of having access to what is 
denoted actually determine the structure of the process of 
information building implied by comprehension). 
3. Two epistemic logics and relevant 
ontological questions 
The concept of semantic information has been at the core 
of knowledge basis representation in AI. Two paths have 
traditionally been followed. The first one is given by 
attempts to represent conceptual links through semantic 
web and frames. This one we shall leave out, mostly 
because it is concerned with a specific way of tracing the 
link from semantics to ontology, linked to Carnap’s 
meaning postulates and Putnam’s basic properties of what 
is denoted, only secondarly concerned with the inferential 
structures of epistemic meaning comprehension proc-
esses. Instead, we shall briefly follow the path of formal 
ontology for epistemic structures, although in a way the 
two paths are obviously linked. 
From the viewpoint of epistemic logic, modality is to be 
treated as the meta-semantical conditionalization of 
epistemic structures (knowledge and belief), functions and 
operations defined on semantics –the latter describing 
reasoning processes inside the logical modal space. A 
possible world can then be defined in terms of a state of 
information in propositional terms, and epistemic relations 
are mapped onto this structure to account e.g. for belief or 
knowledge semantical conditions from the viewpoint of set-
theoretic semantics. Here a central notion seems to be that 
of propositional indeterminacy, for the treatment of which a 
non-normal modal approach to possible worlds is 
obviuosly required. The definition of propositional 
indeterminacy in epistemic logic has been a fundamental 
tool against logical omniscience.The notion of indetermin-
cay is parasytic on that of possibility, so again we are 
confronted with our basic problem. There are mainly two 
basic ways of treating indeterminacy and thus possibility, 
in formalizing information acquisition processes. 
The first way is to use a synctactical approach, and 
Konolige’s system, proposed in 1986, gives us an 
interesting example of it. The example is obviously linked 
with an internalist position such as Moore’s and Hendrix’s 
hypothesis – thus owing much to the psychologist account 
of epistemic modality, and very little to the idea that 
modality should be taken as something contibuting to 
explain how language fits some formal structure of reality. 
Konolige takes beliefs held by epistemic subjects to be 
sets of formulas, e.g. statements and not propositions, 
deductively closed under logically incomplete rules of 
inferences. Properties of beliefs are operationalized inside 
deduction structures associated with subjects. A deduction 
structure is a structure d(i) made up by a pair <b(i), ρ(i)> (a 
sub-set of believed formulas and a set of rules of infer-
ences). Belief relation is then represented as a structure: 
Bel(<b(i), ρ(i)>) = {a | b(i)├ρ(i) a} 
The system is thought as a way to give account of 
provinciality of belief structures, that is: it is established 
that the number of premises for every rule application must 
be fixed and finite. So, every inference from a defined 
belief sub-set is independent from the whole belief set. 
Semantically, here you have a classical set-theoretic 
notion of interpretation for the non-modal sub-sets, plus 
the synctactic sieves for the modal formulas.  
So, for example, M╞p (for an atomic p) iff φ(p)=t; M╞ 
a&b iff M╞ a and M╞ b, and so on. For the modal belief 
relation: M╞ Bi a (that is: it is true under interpretation M 
that “a” is believed) iff a ε Bel(d(i)), where d(i) belongs to 
the set of deduction structures or points of view consid-
ered. For the axiomatization: the semantics is correct 
under PC axioms, modus ponens, a specification of a set 
of deduction rules for every deduction structure and, most 
important, a linking rule LR for which:  
From Bi a 1…. Bi a k and from a 1…. a k ├ρ(i) b, it follows that 
Bi b. 




The linking rule allows inferences through the link with 
synctactic structure in the model. Obviuosly the system 
does not use the notion of “possible world”. It therefore 
tries to avoid problems concerning propositional possibility. 
Inferential structures produce a formal partition on the 
universe-set, dividing statements believed from statements 
not believed through the sieve given by synctactic 
consequence relations. These are in turned based on the 
meaning of logical constants, given in merely combinatory 
terms by the underliyng meta-linguistic theory. However, 
here the informative content of meaning is completely left 
out, precisely because there is no propositional structure 
onto which inference models are mapped onto. As a 
matter of fact, in synctactic models the latter are mapped 
onto themselves. This has in turn a consequence on the 
formal deduction relations: the only condition posed on a 
deduction is synctactic consistency, whereas the proposi-
tional approach suggests that epistemic modality must in 
some way be related to some stronger semantical 
condition specifying the formal structure of our way of 
believing (and knowing) things. In other words: something 
concerning the formal partition on reality considered must 
account for the way we relate to reality (here reality is 
intended in a weak sense: as a set of objects and links 
among objects, eventually computable as functions and 
operations on them). From our point of view, even if 
synctactical accounts such as Konolige’s allow for 
acquisition of information through application of estab-
lished deduction rules, this information is not at all an 
information properly (that is: something saying what kind of 
formal structure of reality should hold if the belief were 
taken to be true). Also: indeterminacy is taken to be only 
an inferential limit. 
Propositional accounts of modal epistemic notions try to 
do for this; however, they are limited by lack of ontological 
investigation and semantical specification. Think for 
example of Levesque’s logics for implicit and explicit belief 
(1985). Here the informative property of modality is 
accounted for through semantical indeterminacy –that is, 
by assuming non classical worlds and treating them as 
situations (where the terminology is an heritage from 
Barwise and Perry). Situations shape the sub-set of reality 
taken to be relevant for a subect’s believes, and leave 
everything else as indeterminate. Of course the notion of 
“being indeterminate” is conditionalized to a determinate 
background of implicit beliefs. These describe “not what an 
agent takes to be true, but what reality would be if what he 
believes were true”. Normal possible worlds are used to 
account for implicit belief; the semantics for explicit belief is 
given in terms of situations, propositional sub-sets whose 
intensions may well lack of a proper informative content 
(for example when situations are inconsistent, that is: there 
is at least a proposition of the sub-set to which both “t” and 
“f” are assigned, or incomplete, that is: the truth value 
assigned is Ø). Here the main interpretation schemes are 
given by: 
i) M, s ╞ t Ea iff M, s’╞ t a for all situations s’ belonging to 
B (set of beliefs) 
ii) M, s ╞ f Ea iff M, s ╡ t Ea 
iii) M, s╞ t Ba iff M, s’╞ t a for all s’ belonging to W(B) (set 
of possible worlds consistent with beliefs) 
iv) M, s ╞ f Ba iff M, s ╡ t Ba. 
While B is closed under implication, E (explicit belief) is not 
(we shall leave out examples of this, since they are quite 
obviuos to imagine if we consider inconsistent situations). 
Also, of course, Ea → Ba. The latter is again the obvious 
precondition for iii), since it states the condition at which 
possible world can complete incomplete situations for 
explicit belief. However, our problem turns up again. That 
is: which is the structure of the process of information 
acquisition allowing to know criteria for relevancy, so that 
what is indeterminate can at some point of inferential 
processes be determined?  
Another very simple example of the problem can be 
found in a very common semantical property assigned to 
propositional belief relations. That is, the closure property 
with respect to set-intersection. So: 
For every w belonging to the set W and for every propo-
sition X and Y (thinkable as sets of worlds) : 
If X∩Y ε N(w) (the latter being the sub-set of possible 
worlds, or the common sub-set of sets of propositions on 
which a modal function is considered), then X ε N(w) and Y 
ε N(w). (Also the inverse holds). 
In propositional terms, and recalling wittgensteinian 
terminology, this means: if you know the possible state of 
affair in which a propositions’ conjunction is true, then you 
know the possible states of affairs in which each one of the 
propositions considered is true. But what kind of informa-
tion is given by this “then”? Shouldn’t such an information 
be semantically specified by accounting for semantical 
properties of the notion of possibility itself? How does the 
introduction of new ways of defining concepts implies new 
information? And how is this information to be thought (for 
example: as an introduction of new state of affairs or as a 
specification of known ones)? Modal notions convey an 
information which is in some way ubiquous.  
Some concluding remarks. A way to confront the se-
mantical-ontological question of defining modal notions 
could be given by a strategic reduction of possibility to 
probability. Consequently, the notion of necessity would be 
treated as the conditionalizing reference term; in Kolmo-
gorov’s classical symbolism, necessity attains to the 
universe-set Ω, where Probability (Ω)=1. The axioms and 
formalizations of probability calculus could then be applied 
to epistemic calculus of belief and knowledge relations; 
something which would intuitively take up De Finetti’s and 
Carnap’s subjective interpretations of probability (De 
Finetti said that probabilities could be thought of as 
degrees of belief). This would seem at a first instance a 
nice way of relating language information-processing to 
some basic structure of reality, thus taking seriously both 
Maxwell’s general idea that “the true logic of reality is the 
logic of probability” and Adams’ version of probability as 
the study of propagation of probability in uncertain 
inferences (where both premises and conclusion are 
uncertain). The most interesting aspects of such an 
approach is probably given by what we are told by 
Kolmogorov’s continuity and countable additivity axioms, 
establishing inversely proportional links between complex-
ity of inferential processes and probabilities of conclusions.  
On the other side, however, logical (as opposed to 
physical) interpretations of probability are confronted by 
general and specific problems similar to those attaining to 
the status of possibility and modal notions. So the question 
would be again: what shall we do with Wittgenstein’s 
remarks, for which modality is to be taken as the very limit 
of the logical space?  
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